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Twin Falls County District 
Court Case No. CV -08-79 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
Comes Now, Appellant, Eric Hettinga, and hereby submits his appellate brief for 
consideration as follows. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Fifth Judicial District, In And For The County of Twin Falls, 
State of Idaho, Hon. G. Richard Bevan presiding. This appeal is from the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in Case No. CV-08-79, which were filed on August 21, 
2009. 
This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of zonmg ordinances. 
Appellant, Eric Hettinga, (hereinafter referred to as "Hettinga"), is requesting that this 
Court hold that his use of the property in question is in compliance with the applicable 
zoning ordinance, reverse the District Court's decision, vacate the injunction against his 
use of the property, or otherwise modify the injunction to further specify what part, if 
any, of his activities are not prohibited. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A Complaint was filed on January 8,2008 on the behalf of Respondent, The County of 
Twin Falls and The City of Filer, (Filer). Amended Complaints were filed on October 16, 
2008 and November 24, 2008. These effectively removed Filer as a party to the action. 
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In summary, the Complaint alleged that Hettinga was operating a trucking and hay 
hauling operation in violation of the planning and zoning ordinances of Twin Falls 
County and Filer. 
An Answer was filed by Hettinga on January 30, 2008. An Amended Answer was filed 
on December 2,2008. In summary, this Answer alleged that Hettinga was not operating a 
trucking business, that Hettinga is in compliance with the zoning ordinance, and in any 
case that Filer was not properly authorized by Twin Falls County to enforce such a 
zoning regulation. 
A court trial was held on May 21, 2009 (although the Court previously conducted a 
view of the premises on September 17, 2008). Thereafter the Court issued its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 21,2009, finding in favor of Twin Falls County 
and issuing an injunction against Hettinga enjoining him from parking his trucks on the 
property in question. 
The only issue on appeal is whether Hettinga's use of the property is in violation of the 
zoning ordinance. 
c. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hettinga resides on property which is owned by his mother. This property is located 
just outside the Filer city limits but it is in the Filer area of impact for planning and 
zoning. It is also located in Twin Falls County. 
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Hettinga does have his home on this property but also parks trucks on the property. He 
uses these trucks for hauling agricultural products. He does not store the products on the 
property, not does he do business from the property. His business involves the purchase 
and sale of agricultural products, and then hauling the products from a farmer's place of 
business to the location of the business to which the product has been sold. 
The property in question falls within the Filer Residential Agricultural District zoning 
ordinance, Title 9 Chapter 5. 
The governing agencies have determined, and the District Court held, that Hettinga's 
use of the property as described above is not within the permitted uses. The Court found 
that Hettinga was impermissibly parking trucks on the property in question. R. pp. 89-
103. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
HETTINGA'S USE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RESIDENTIAL AGRICULTURAL ORDINANCE. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred In Ruling That Hettinga Violated The City Of 
Filer's Zoning Ordinance By Parking Trucks On The Property At Which He 
Resides. 
1. Facts Supported By the Record. 
Shari Hart is employed by the City of Filer as the city/clerk treasurer and had been for 
sixteen years prior to the trial in this matter. Her general duties are to handle building 
permits, answer zoning question and keep track of city council meetings, among other 
things. Tr.p. 11, L. 7-22. 
Ms. Hart is familiar with the property at issue and it is located in the 
residential/agricultural area of impact which is designated in yellow on the map adopted 
by the City of Filer. Tr. p. 13, L. 17-25, p. 14, L. 1-9, see also Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiff s Exhibits 2 and 3 are the Twin Falls and Filer area of impact zoning ordinances 
respectively and Exhibit 4 is Chapter 5 Title 9 of the Filer City Code, Residential 
Agricultural District Regulations. Tr.pp. 14, L. 10-25. 
Hettinga resides (and did at the time of trial) at 2319 East, 4000 North in the city of 
Filer. (Although this is his address, the property is physically outside the city, in the city 
area of impact in the County of Twin Falls). Hettinga does not own this property. Tr. pp. 
110, L. 8-12. Attie Schaap, Hettinga's mother, owns the property. Tr. p. 111, L. 1-7. 
Defendant's exhibit A. 
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This parcel is 1.1 acres. Hettinga resides on the north side of the property. He moved 
there in 1998. This home is 2000 square feet with three bedrooms and two baths. There is 
a yard, a fence and on the southern end of the property Hettinga parks trucks. Tr. p. 111, 
L. 5-18. 
Hettinga conducts a small independent trucking operation consisting of hauling alfalfa, 
hay and straw to dairies from farms. His job includes contacting the farmers and getting 
hay tested. He then evaluates the current market and sells it to dairies and feed lots. Only 
after that does he haul it. 
The contact with farmers and buyers is not made from the residence. Hettinga meets the 
farmers at their own property. Hettinga does not advertise from his property or send bills 
from his property. He does not receive any payments for those bills at his residence. Even 
though Hettinga has a landline telephone at his residence he only uses a cell phone for his 
business. Additionally, Hettinga only does business with agricultural products. Tr.p. 
115, L. 22-25. Tr.pp.116-117. 
Hettinga does not stockpile hay on the property and he does not bring loads of hay to 
the property (with the exception of one time a couple of years after he moved in). Tr.p. 
118. L. 12-25. He also does not keep business records at the property. Tr.p.121, L. 16-19. 
Hettinga has no employees. 
Hettinga operates four trucks, (author's note; this is Hettinga' s statement but it appears 
from the record that in fact there are only three trucks). Tr.p. 117, L. 10. These are a 1970 
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Kenworth, a 1980 Freightliner, and a 1985 Peterbuilt. These are all owned by Attie 
Schaapp. Tr. pp. 112-114. Defendant's exhibits B, C, and D. 
At the time of the trial there were only two trucks being parked on the property and 
only one that was licensed. Hettinga only used this one to haul hay. The other trucks are 
older. They are in the shop part of the time and Hettinga cannot afford to license them all 
at once. He somewhat uses them as spares and trades the trucks around to use. Tr.pp.117-
118. Repairs on the trucks are not done on the property. Tr.p. 119. L. 3-9. 
Hettinga does not conduct business on the property at all. He simply parks his truck and 
equipment there. Tr.p. 129, L. 18-25. pp. 130, L 22-25. p. 131, L 1-3. 
The neighborhood around the property in question includes about twenty different lots, 
averaging between an acre to two and one-half acres. It is zoned for 
residential/agriculture. Tr.p. 121. L. 20-24. 
The neighborhood includes agricultural areas and many residences that use the property 
for purposes other than strictly residential. Mr. Robinson is a neighbor at 3998 North 
2300 East in Filer. This is in the area of impact and just west of Hettinga's property. Mr. 
Robinson has a three bay shop with a backhoe also parked there. Tr.p. 122, L.14-24, p. 
123, L.2-14. Defendant's exhibit J. 
Alan Justesen, another neighbor parks his dump truck on his property. Tr.pp. 123, L. 
21-25. Defendant's exhibit J. Another neighbor parks a large semi truck hauling a rock 
crusher or portable paver on his property. Tr.p. 124, L. 12-25. Another neighbor, Jerry 
Smith, also has a shop on his property. Tr.p. 125, L. 7-15. Defendant's exhibit J. These 
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properties are in the area of impact. Other neighbors park dump trucks and business 
pressure washers on their property. Tr.pp. 126-127. 
2. Legal Authorities Applied to the Facts. 
Article XII, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "[a]ny county or 
incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, 
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general 
laws." 
The Twin Falls County Ordinance Section 8-9-19 governs city of impact areas. 
Subsection C governs the area of impact for the City of Filer. This authorizes enactment, 
adoption and enforcement of zoning ordinances by the City of Filer. 
Twin Falls County Ordinance §8-9-19 (c) (1) adopts the Filer area of impact map 
within the unincorporated area of Twin Falls County. Section (c) (4) of the same 
ordinance states: 
The area of city impact shall be administered by the city's governing board. 
Two (2) of the commission members shall serve as representatives of the area of 
impact. The area of impact members shall serve as representatives of the area of 
impact. The area of impact members shall be appointed by the county 
commissioners with concurrence of the city council. The area of impact members 
so appointed shall serve terms of three (3) years. The member appointed by the 
county commissioners shall be a resident within the area of impact, residing 
outside the city limits and shall vote on all are of impact issues coming before the 
governing board. 
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Filer City Code Section 9-5-1 provides in part: 
Purpose: The R-A residential agricultural zone is intended to provide areas for 
low density residential development and continuation of farm uses where 
compatible with each other. 
Filer's zoning ordinance section 9-5-2 provides the use regulations for R-A or 
Residential Agricultural Districts within Filer's area of impact. Section 9-5-2 governs 
permitted uses. Subsection A Permitted Uses: 
Cemeteries. 
Churches and religious facilities. 
Home occupations, suburban, rural or external. 
Noncommercial public parks and recreation grounds and buildings. 
One- and two-family dwellings. 
The growing of soil crops, including all farming, livestock and poultry raising 
activities. 
In Potts v. City of Hugo, 416 N.W. 2d 465,467 (Minn. App. 1987) the court addressed 
the standard of review for zoning ordinances and stated: 
Thus, where the question is whether and ordinance is applicable to certain facts is 
for the governmental authority, but the manner of applying the ordinance to the 
facts is for the court. 
In Hettinga's case there is little disagreement as to the facts. He does no business from 
the residence, not even telephone calls. He keeps no office, no records, no employees, 
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does not stock product. He only parks vehicles used to transport agricultural products. 
This Court has free review of the application of the ordinance to the facts of this case. 
In St. Louis County v. Taggert, 866 S.W. 2d 181 (Mo. App. 1993), the appellate court 
set forth the principles of construction used in interpreting a zoning regulation as follows: 
1. The determination of what uses are permitted under a zoning ordinance must be 
made on the basis of the wording of a particular ordinance and the context in 
which it occurs; 
2. The basic rule of statutory construction is to seek the intention of the legislators 
and, if possible, to effectuate that intention: 
3. Legislative intent must be ascertained by giving the word an ordinary, plain and 
natural meaning, by considering the entire act and its purposes and by seeking to 
avoid an unjust, absurd, unreasonable or oppressive result: 
4. Zoning ordinances, being in derogation of common law property rights, are to be 
strictly construed in favor of the property owner against the zoning authority; 
5. Where a term in a zoning ordinance is susceptible of more than one interpretation, 
the courts are to give weight to the interpretation that, while still within the 
confines of the term, is least restrictive upon the rights of the property owner to 
use his land as he wishes; 
6. The interpretation placed upon a zoning ordinance by the body in charge of its 
enactment and application is entitled to great weight. 
Also citing Cunningham v. Board of Alderman of Overland, 691 S.W. 2d 476, 478 
(Mo. App. 1991). St. Louis County, Supra, at 182. 
By following the above rules of construction for a zoning ordinance we first analyze the 
wording of a particular ordinance and the context in which it occurs. The context is in an 
agricultural area and to protect such use of that area. This is not limited to using property 
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only for actual farming, but for uses within the context of an agricultural area. Certainly 
the means for transporting agricultural products must be within the context of an 
agriculturally zoned district. In fact, other neighbors parking backhoes or dump trucks 
does not seem offensive to the zoning restrictions. The business of agriculture could not 
even be conducted without using large pieces of equipment and generally keeping that 
equipment on the property for long periods of time. 
Next, the intent of the governmental authority should be ascertained and effectuated. 
Common sense would dictate that in the face of urban sprawl those agricultural zoning 
restrictions are meant to protect the rural agriculture way of life and promote economic 
stability of such endeavors. Operations such as Hettinga's should be promoted. 
If a district is zoned agricultural but the means to transport (or other large vehicles used 
for agricultural purposes) were not allowed to be parked in the district then the result 
would be absurd and unreasonable. Would this also mean that a farmer whose residence 
is on one particular acre of property could not park his tractor or truck on that property if 
the property he actually farms upon is separately described in another deed or even one-
half mile down the road? Would he not be allowed to park the means to transport his 
product, even if it were to only to transport from one field to another? One sees trucks for 
hauling parked in fields or on farmer's residences all the time. Would a person in this 
zoning district be required to either join all parcels of property into one deed with his 
residence on it, with the residence off it? Would he be required to separate his residential 
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property in another deed? Can he only park large vehicles on the land upon which crops 
are actually growing? Would that be prohibited also? 
It is understandable that a truck hauling scrap metal or such, would be prohibited in an 
agricultural district, but parking a truck hauling agriculture products? That is not only a 
reasonable use of the property but a necessary one for the area. 
The next two considerations are that zoning restrictions should be strictly construed 
against the governmental authority and if subject to two different interpretations then the 
one least restrictive against the property owner should be used. 
In Hettinga's case the obviously least restrictive interpretation of the allowable use 
from the zoning ordinance phrasing "including all farming, livestock and poultry raising 
activities", includes allowing parking of the means to transport agricultural products. 
In City of Boise City V. Gabica, 106 Idaho 94, 675 P.2d 354 (App. 1984), the Court of 
Appeals addressed a zoning issue in what is probably the closest Idaho case factually to 
Hettinga's case. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court issued an injunction against the Gabicas to cease 
certain business activities from their residence. The Gabicas conducted a carpet cleaning 
business from their home. The City sought to enjoin the Gabicas from such business 
activity. The Gabica's residence was in a neighborhood zoned R-IC which specifies 
single family dwellings as the principal land use in that neighborhood. 
The Gabicas were conducting bookkeeping and telephone communications form inside 
the house. It appears the house was essentially the office. They also parked one or two 
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business vans on the property. Employees picked these vans up in the morning and were 
dispatched to particular jobs. The equipment was also cleaned on the property. 
The District Court declined to enjoin the bookkeeping and telephone communication or 
the parking of the vans. The Court did however, enjoin cleaning business equipment and 
dispatching employees from the residence. Only the issue of the injunction against 
dispatching employees was appealed but the Appellate Court did address the issue of 
what is an "accessory use". 
The City relied upon § 11-2-4.2 of the Boise City Code. This allows: 
"[a]ccessory uses relating to single-family dwelling[s]" in R-IC districts. Section 
11-1-3 defines the "use, accessory" as "[a] use incidental and subordinate to the 
principal use of the premises which does not alter the essential characteristics of 
the use considered as a whole and as related to other uses permitted in the same 
district." Supra, at 95. (Underline emphasis added by this author). 
The Appellate Court did uphold the injunction by saying, "[o]ur characterization of the 
business is consistent with the general view that a commercial enterprise, conducted to 
make money, is a principal use, of itself, and is not occasioned by day-to-day living in a 
residential area. (Citations omitted). Supra, at 96. 
This case is helpful because it demonstrates that operating a business from a home in a 
single dwelling residential district is not, at least in part, inconsistent with the use of the 
property in the area or district. The District Court did hold that the activities inside the 
home were allowable and parking the vans was allowable. Whether that decision would 
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have been upheld were those issues appealed may be debatable, but the point that some 
activities which do not affect the character of the area are allowable, is certainly one that 
favors Hettinga in this case. 
Hettinga did not conduct any business activities from his home, nor clean or repair 
equipment (except it appears, once) on the property. He did not have employees on the 
property (he has no employees). He only parked trucks. 
More importantly, Hettinga's property is in a district zoned for residential and 
agriculture. Hettinga only provides transportation for agricultural products. Hettinga's 
operation is entirely consistent with the agricultural area and does not alter the essential 
characteristics of the use considered as a whole and as related to other uses permitted in 
the same district. 
In Taddeo v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 412 A. 2d 212 (1980), Taddeo resided in 
an area zoned as R-1 which is a Rural-Residential area. Taddeo conducted an asphalt 
business at a different address but parked various vehicles necessary for the business at 
his residence. This included trucks, rollers, trailers, back-hoes and other equipment. 
Employees showed up at the residence to pick these vehicles up for the workday 
because it was easier for them. Also, the registered business address was the residence 
address. 
The trial court held the residential address was being used for commercial purposes. 
This was upheld on appeal. 
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In the instant case the zoning is residential-agricultural, not just residential. Also, 
Hettinga's use of the property has far less indicia of running a business than did the facts 
in Taddeo. 
In St. Louis County v. Taggert, 866 S.W. 2d 181 (Mo. App. 1993), the County sought 
to enjoin Taggert from conducting a commercial business on his residential property in 
an area zoned residential. Taggert was parking two dump trucks used for hauling gravel 
on his residence. The trial court held such parking did not violate the zoning ordinance, 
the appellate court reversed. 
The Missouri appellate court said the case was one example of permissive zoning, which 
is what the District Court in the instant case held. The St. Louis County court said: 
A permissive zoning ordinance is drawn to show those uses which are permitted 
for a particular district and any use which is not expressly permitted in a given 
zone or district is thereby excluded from it. (Citations omitted). Permitted uses 
may be explicitly expressed or may belong to a group of uses in generically 
expressed categories. (Underline added by this author). 
Id. at 183. 
The court further stated, "In determining whether use is accessory or incidental to a 
primary use, the decision must be made on the basis of the particular zoning ordinance 
and the context in which it occurs. Schaefer v. Neuman, 561 S.W. 2d 426, 424 (Mo. App. 
1978)" Id. at 183. 
Of course in the instant case, the zoning is for residential/agriculture. The agricultural 
use is expressly allowed and trucking only agricultural products is certainly incidental to 
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the expressed category of agriculture. Also, since agriculture is generally expressed as the 
use of the district and the ordinance should be strictly construed against the governing 
authority, allowing Hettinga to park his trucks in such a zoned area should be allowable. 
The District Court in the instant case used the St. Louis County case for the proposition 
that the parking of a commercial vehicle on residential property is not a permissible 
accessory use of the property. 
However, Hettinga's case differs in that the property at issue is zoned as agricultural. 
His trucks are for agricultural uses only. Also, he does not run a trucking business from 
his mother's residence at all. 
The District Court in the instant case also cited Galliford v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 430 A. 2d 1222 (1981). In that case the son of a homeowner, whose 
residence was in a zoned residential district, regularly parked a 14,500 pound truck cab 
outside. The court held, among other things, that the truck was not an incidental use of, or 
accessory to the use of the residential property. 
However, again, in contrast to Galliford, Hettinga has agricultural trucks parked in an 
agricultural zoned district. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although Hettinga does park trucks on residential property, such activity is related to 
and concerns only agricultural activities. In view of the essential characteristics of the use 
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considered as a whole and as related to other uses permitted in the same district 
Hettinga's use of the property is within the context of the zoning ordinance and the 
decision of the District Court should be reversed and the injunction vacated. 
v. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Appellant hereby requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted on behalf of Appellant. 
Dated this /t- day of June, 2010. 
Tim J. W· lam 
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